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By late 2004, Australia and Papua New 
Guinea appeared to have agreed on a new course 
for their now-close, now-distant relationship. To 
be known officially as the Enhanced Cooperation 
Program (ECP), the new course signaled a more 
interventionist role by Australia in assisting – or 
directing – Papua New Guinea’s efforts to improve 
its governance institutions and effectiveness. The 
ECP does not come out of the blue. Rather, it is 
the most recent development in some 120 years of 
colonial and post-independence contact between 
Australia and PNG. It is important to recall this 
background as we seek clearer understandings of 
the ECP’s objectives and its likelihood of success, 
however measured. 
I: INTRODUCTION
Australia’s new interventionism in the South 
Pacific was heralded in a broad-ranging speech by 
Prime Minister John Howard in July 2003:
[O]ur friends and neighbours in the Paciﬁc 
are looking to us for leadership and we 
cannot fail them. And the rest of the world, 
understandably, sees this as an area where 
Australia has particular responsibilities. 
(Howard 2003)
This new focus by Australia on the region is 
motivated in the first instance by security fears 
arising from post-independence mutations of 
traditional (“wantok” and “bigman”) structures 
of power into virulent forms of crony politics. 
The security fears include the making of 
“inappropriate” alliances (e.g., with Taiwan) 
that could destabilize the region, facilitating 
the activities of international crime syndicates 
(drugs, guns, and people-smuggling, money-
laundering, piracy), and providing (wittingly or 
otherwise) bases or through-fares for terrorist 
groups like Jemaah Islamiah (Dupont 2001; van 
Fossen 2003). 
There is also growing evidence that this 
mutating cronyism in South Pacific political 
systems is resistant to democratic institutions, 
transparency in government, and conventional 
state-making strategies. It might reflect, as 
Christopher Clapham has observed, “the 
inability of many states and societies at the local 
level to meet the onerous demands that state 
maintenance makes on them” (Clapham 2004: 
77). At the very least, the idea of the modern 
state remains highly problematic in the region 
– and this appears especially to be the case in 
Papua New Guinea (Ballard 1981; Dinnen 1997; 
May 2003; Gelu 2003; Gelu 2004).
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The negative consequences of post-
independence politics include poor economic 
performances and widespread collapses in 
essential government services – e.g., hospitals 
and medical aid posts, schools, transport and 
communications, security and policing. They 
result in manipulated election results and 
debauched political institutions. They are the 
basis of random – usually gratuitous – human rights 
violations by fragments of state agencies (e.g., 
police units and defence force units) often acting 
autonomously from their command structures. 
They are a source of inordinate levels of violence, 
crime and corruption. They add up to a great 
deal of human misery, with thousands of people 
suffering needlessly and dying prematurely. All of 
these problems are painfully evident – and they 
are increasing – in contemporary Papua New 
Guinea.1 
But it is not principally the human dimensions 
of this evolving governance catastrophe that 
stirred Australia to adopt its renewed approach 
to the region. As already noted, there is growing 
anxiety that the South Pacific is turning into 
a region of instability, threatening Australia’s 
security interests and the interests of important 
allies. And within this anxiety is a marked 
desire to blame that instability on “failing states” 
thought to be emerging of their own accord in 
the region. 
This hardening orthodoxy ignores the fact 
that in almost all post-colonial situations, top-
down state-making – much of it the result 
of decolonization processes and subsequent 
foreign aid, foreign investment and trade, and 
other neo-colonial interventions – has been far 
less successful than anticipated. In not a few 
instances it has failed abysmally. John Ballard 
has explained that this is because “The state 
itself was a colonial concept, imposed upon 
pre-colonial societies with disregard for their 
own structures and boundaries except where pre-
colonial states provided useful adjuncts through 
indirect rule” (Ballard 1981: 3). If this remains 
unacknowledged, blunders will continue to be 
made. Their perpetrators will continue blaming 
victims, instead of working with them to counter 
the mounting problems. A large proportion of 
these problems are legacies from colonial times; 
others are well and truly homegrown. 
Fresh models of state-making are therefore 
needed. They must draw on grassroots community 
experiences, as well as employing and adapting 
conventional methods of development planning 
and implementation. 
II: AUSTRALIAN SECURITY ANXIETIES 
AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC
The recent ratcheting up of Australia’s 
intervention in the South Pacific arises, in the first 
instance, from entrenched collective anxieties 
about its geo-political location (Broinowski 1993; 
FitzGerald 1997; Walker 1999). The Asia-Pacific 
region still evokes baleful and/or paternalistic 
reactions from many Australians – reactions that 
are occasionally shared and sometimes cynically 
manipulated by their leaders. So it should not 
be all that surprising that Australia’s regional 
phobias have intensified in the face of perceived 
political disorder and governance decay in some 
South Pacific states. 
While the 2004 Australian general election 
outcome was mostly a result of “aspirational voters” 
punting on low interest rates being maintained 
by the Howard Government, security issues were 
also significant in ensuring the Coalition’s return 
on 9th October (Barker 2005).2 Prevailing neo-
conservative rhetoric coupled with alarmist media 
coverage misinforms the public, encouraging 
paranoia about the world situation and deep 
suspicion of the foreign “other” – especially the 
Islamic “other”. This is what many Australians 
have been experiencing in the wake of the 
destruction of New York’s World Trade Centre 
in September 2001, the Bali bombings in 2003, 
and the bombing outside the Australian Embassy 
in Jakarta in 2004. It intensifies every time an 
abducted victim is beheaded, or another suicide 
bomber explodes him or herself somewhere, 
in which innocent bystanders are the main 
casualties, and the gruesome details appear on 
the Al Jazeera network and are then replayed on 
Western networks. 
In many voters’ minds Australia seems 
dangerously remote from its natural allies, 
isolated in a region that is still unfamiliar and 
therefore threatening.3 This sentiment is potently 
present in Australia’s political culture, lurking 
in the interstices of Pauline Hanson’s all but 
defunct One Nation Party and successor groups 
like the rising Family First Party, and in the 
paranoid fringes of the National Party and the 
ALP (see, e.g., Stokes 2000). Incubating within 
this cultural mix are right-wing Pentecostal 
and fundamentalist Christian sects preaching 
eschatological doctrines of exclusive salvation 
and post-Cold War Western triumphalism.4 These 
groups have strong evangelical overtones and 
are increasingly connected to neo-conservative 
political organizations. Some of their political 
consequences are evident in recent electoral 
trends in Australia and the USA.5
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IV: AUSTRALIA AND PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA
Principally focused on its own security, 
Australia’s imagining of PNG has mostly been 
coloured by paternalism, particularly when Sir 
Paul Hasluck was Minister for External Territories 
in the Menzies Government (Hasluck 1976; 
Millar 1978; Downs 1980; Porter 1994; Fry 
1997). Hasluck argued that Australia would have 
to remain the colonial power for decades to come 
(Hasluck 1976). In the wake of the 1962-63 Foot 
Report to the UN, and the World Bank Report in 
1966, later conservative Ministers (e.g., Charles 
Barnes) began conceding that some form of 
self-government or independence (preferably, in 
their view, the former) would have to come about 
earlier than Hasluck had anticipated (Downs 
1980: 239-248; Millar 1979: 313-316; see also 
Griffin et al. 1979). But it never seemed to 
cross their minds that Australia’s stolid policies 
might have been inhibiting social, political and 
economic development in PNG.6 Like many 
an apology for colonialism, the paternalist 
approach of Australia’s administration in PNG 
was continually dressed up as a case of acting in 
the best interests of the “natives”. It is true that 
throughout Australia’s colonial administration 
Papua New Guineans’ interests were sometimes 
realised – but only when they meshed with 
Australia’s interests.
So, in 1973, prompted by its ham-fisted 
Minister for Overseas Territories, Bill Morrison, 
the Whitlam Government began pushing PNG 
towards an early independence, even though 
many Papua New Guineans were deeply 
disturbed by what it might mean for them. 
Highlanders, for example, were worried that 
they would be politically, educationally, and 
economically disadvantaged compared to coastal 
and islander Papuans and New Guineans. Papuans 
and Islanders were anxious about invasions of 
uncouth Highlanders in their midst. A mature-
age university student, recalling his feelings as a 
school boy about the approach of independence, 
has noted:
The news broke out and everyone in 
town [Madang] was frightened. I was dead 
scared after the speculation of nationwide 
bloodshed. At school we approached the 
headmaster (an Australian) and asked him 
many questions about our safety. (Kamya 
2005)
These fears have been justified by subsequent 
periods of political mismanagement, especially 
during the years of the Chan, Wingti and Skate 
Governments (Dorney 1990; Dorney 1998). 
III: MIDDLE POWER, OR BIG-NOTING?
The new Australian interventionism in the 
South Pacific is a manifestation of the country’s 
self-image as a middle power in global affairs. 
The proponents of this assertiveness point out 
that Australia is a close ally of the USA hyper-
power, that it is a role model for representative 
democratic institutions in the region, that it 
is a major exemplar and advocate of Western 
values in the region, and that it is the dominant 
influence in the regional politics of the South 
Pacific. In an address to the National Press Club 
in Canberra in November 2003, Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer made it clear that he has 
no doubts about Australia’s regional and global 
significance:
We are a strong commonwealth with about 
the 12th largest economy in the world. We 
are one of the most successful, peaceful 
and well-governed democracies in history. 
Rather than a middling nation, we are a 
considerable power, the sixth largest in 
total land mass. (Downer 2003)
This official view of Australia in the world is 
echoed in recent foreign policy pronouncements 
about Australia being America’s “deputy” in 
the region, even America’s “deputy sheriff”. 
While mainly intended for domestic political 
consumption, this sort of talk does not go down 
well in Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta. And it sorely 
irritates those whom Tony Abbott refers to as 
the “commentariat” in Australia. However, it 
resonates harmoniously with aspirational voters 
in increasingly neo-conservative electorates. 
They applaud the big-noting; it reassures and 
mobilizes them. 
During the 2004 election campaign the Prime 
Minister repeated previous declarations that 
Australia has the right to strike against potential 
terrorist bases in the territories of neighbouring 
sovereign states. Alexander Downer hastened to 
smooth the ruffled feathers of several Southeast 
Asian governments, explaining that the Prime 
Minister meant certain “failing states” in the 
South Pacific. He did not name the states to which 
he was referring. The fact that both the Prime 
Minister’s declarations and the Foreign Minister’s 
claims were perceived at least as offensively in the 
South Pacific, but that no Australian qualification 
or apology was subsequently forthcoming, is 
indicative of Australian Government attitudes 
towards the region.
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In pushing PNG into an early independence, 
Gough Whitlam first sought to appease African 
states that were critical in the UN of what they 
saw as Australia’s desultory colonial record in 
PNG. The irony is that African post-colonial 
hubris and naivety about PNG combined to push 
for a problematic independence. Conservative 
commentators such as Peter Ryan defensively refer 
to this period as “Whitlam’s cardinal blunder: the 
infliction on the reluctant people of Papua New 
Guinea of an “independence” that was unkind 
and unwise” (Ryan 2004: 96).
A second group Whitlam sought to appease 
constituted an emerging political leadership 
in PNG that from the late 1960s had been 
demanding independence. Initially this leadership 
was idealistic, anti-colonialist, and full of great 
energy and promise. Leaders within and around 
the early Pangu Pati, and then those connected 
with the Constitutional Planning Committee, 
shared a vision of a rapidly developing PNG state 
bringing widespread benefits to its people.7 Some 
of this idealism is evident in the Constitution, 
in the original Eight Point Plan, and in policy 
intentions to adapt development strategies to 
the so-called “Melanesian Way”, and vice versa. 
But by the 1980s, much of the fire had gone out 
of this radical politics. Public office came largely 
to be sought for its perks and trappings – private 
business developments and related get-rich-quick 
opportunities, imperial knighthoods, frequent 
overseas travel, large cars, official residences, 
generous parliamentary salaries and electoral 
allowances. Some leaders over-estimated their 
capacities to deliver good governance. Some of 
them are still in power, practicing the same kinds 
of politics, contributing little to nation-building 
and much to state weakness in PNG. 
Whitlam followed a trend set by Evatt and 
Menzies for Australian prime ministers and 
foreign ministers to travel the world assuming 
the mantle of an influential middle power 
(Watt 1968; Leaver and Cox 1997). Amidst 
the diplomacy in this vaulting ambition, PNG 
in particular, and the South Pacific generally, 
mostly disappeared off Australia’s diplomatic 
radar. Nonetheless Australian aid to the PNG 
Government continued, on the assumption that 
development was proceeding smoothly. The over-
riding official concern in Australia was to avoid 
being accused of neo-colonialism. Better to follow 
a policy of benign neglect than one requiring 
active engagement that could be misconstrued 
in an international climate of narrow political 
correctness. 
Much of the official government-to-
government aid provided by Australia at this time 
came without strings attached.8 This was widely 
seen as progressive because it permitted PNG’s 
leaders to set their own priorities. Meanwhile 
Australia remained remote, preoccupied with 
what its leaders saw as more auspicious foreign and 
defence policy objectives. But as things started to 
deteriorate in PNG, Australia’s aloofness was 
to prove disastrous. Some Australian policy 
makers realized that AusAID, with its substantial 
development experience from the 1970s, could 
address specific crises in PNG. Yet by the time 
things were really serious, AusAID had already 
lost its limited clout in Canberra. 
There are few if any systematic measures 
of the effectiveness of Australian aid to PNG 
– amounting to about $15.5 billion in today’s 
dollars. (Indeed there are few scholarly accounts of 
the effectiveness of international aid anywhere.) 
Despite all the hand-wringing accompanying 
it, and despite some trenchantly doctrinaire 
attacks on Australian aid to the South Pacific, 
official Australia took little interest in what was 
happening to its near north and made only half-
hearted attempts to engage with PNG’s leaders.
However by the late 1990s, international 
necessity mothered a change in Australian 
attitudes. The Prime Minister was becoming 
more confident in the international arena. At 
the same time he needed convincing grounds for 
resisting George W. Bush’s pressures to send more 
Australian troops to Iraq. So the Government 
reversed its earlier policy of distancing itself from 
the Asia Pacific. It became committed to helping 
establish an independent state in East Timor. 
It took a major role in the Bougainville peace 
process. 
Following the international terrorist attacks 
in September 2001 the momentum of change 
noticeably increased. In 2003 Prime Minister 
Howard attended the annual meeting of the 
South Pacific Forum and strong-armed the other 
South Pacific heads to agree to the appointment 
of an Australian as the new Secretary-General 
of the Pacific Islands Forum.9 He successfully 
supported the appointment of an Eminent 
Persons Group (EPG) to recommend proposals for 
improving regional cooperation and integration 
in the region (Pacific Islands Forum 2004a; 
Pacific Islands Forum 2004b).10 Significantly, 
the first decision to emerge from these promising 
discussions within the Forum is an agreement for 
a study of security cooperation in the region. The 
study is funded by Australia and New Zealand, 
each contributing a million dollars. But perhaps 
the most surprising element in the renewal of 
Australian interest in the South Pacific was the 
announcement of the Enhanced Cooperation 
Program: the ECP.
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V: ENTER THE ECP
If the Regional Assistance Mission to the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is one of the early 
steps towards reshaping Australia’s approaches 
to the South Pacific, then the ECP in PNG is 
another. The ECP was conceived in Canberra and 
remains principally an Australian government 
initiative. Even so, some leading PNG politicians 
and leaders actively encouraged its gestation and 
attended its birth. As Mike Manning has pointed 
out: 
It was not forced on PNG by Australia 
in any way. PNG ministers realised there 
were serious problems […] and took the 
initiative to seek assistance to solve the 
problem. (Manning 2005) 
It is noteworthy that the ECP is not part of 
a regional consensus on action to be taken in 
PNG. This is in contrast to the commitments 
to Bougainville and RAMSI which are both 
multilateral arrangements. The ECP is an example 
of Australian unilateralism. Its advocates insist 
that it is aimed at bolstering the PNG state 
against service delivery breakdowns, a growing 
law and order crisis, political decay, and endemic 
corruption in politics, business, and the public 
service. In this respect it is both continuous 
with past practices and a departure from those 
practices. In the past, aid schemes targeted 
similar institutions to those being targeted by the 
ECP – e.g., the police. But the ECP differs from 
past practice in that the assistance is coming not 
from advisers, but from Australian officers placed 
in in-line positions. This represents a significant 
shift, from private consultants and contractors 
formerly hired by agencies like AusAID, to 
seconded Australian public servants and police 
officers operating in PNG.
When it reaches its full strength (around 
mid-2005), the ECP will entail the deployment 
of 210 Australian police officers and about 70 
senior public servants in PNG. At the outset, 
it was suggested that the ECP would be all 
about experienced Australian police training 
PNG police to be more effective in law and order 
problem zones. The senior Australian public 
servants would assume mentoring and supervising 
roles in strategically located public service posts 
– in Treasury, Finance, Personnel Management, 
and the Attorney-General’s Departments. In due 
course some Australian judges and legal officials 
would be integrated into the PNG judicial 
system. This is labeled as a “whole of government 
approach” to PNG, to distinguish it from the old 
targeted aid project approaches. A guarantee was 
made that no Papua New Guineans would lose 
their jobs as a result of ECP deployments.11 
There are two goals being aimed at by the 
ECP that complement Australia’s over-riding 
security concerns. 
First, the ECP is intended as a capacity-
building exercise. Senior Australian bureaucrats, 
police officers and legal personnel are expected 
to play a major skills-transfer role while they are 
in PNG. This includes mentoring, supervising, 
instructing, and providing resources to Papua 
New Guineans, to enable them to perform at 
more effective levels in their professional tasks. 
They in turn will pass on their skills to the next 
generation of Papua New Guineans. 
Second, administrative and crime control 
measures have been promised to deal with 
immediate governance problems. If the RAMSI 
model has any relevance, some senior PNG 
politicians, public servants, police officers, law 
officers, and business figures should soon be 
languishing in gaol. Indeed one of the real tests 
of the ECP’s eventual legitimacy in PNG will 
depend on just how swiftly some notorious public 
figures end up behind bars. Not a few Papua New 
Guineans look forward to this happening.
VI: WHY THE ECP?
There are four broad influences shaping the 
Australian government’s ECP in PNG. 
(i) Terrorism/Security
Concerns about terrorism have inflamed many 
governments’ fears about security since September 
2001. In Australia these fears were fanned by the 
bombings in Bali and Jakarta. There is no doubt 
that the Howard Government is preoccupied with 
security issues. But it has rather too adroitly linked 
the issues of asylum-seekers and international 
terrorism. The Government’s professed concerns 
therefore have to be weighed against distorted 
accounts of children being thrown overboard by 
their asylum-seeking parents and the Tampa crisis 
during the 2002 election campaign, misleading 
reports about the sinking of the vessel SIEV X, 
and rubbery rationales supplied for Australia’s 
commitment to the Iraq war (see, e.g., analyses 
by Marr and Wilkinson 2003; Kevin 2003; 
Broinowski 2004; Manne with Corlett 2004; 
Gaita 2004). Almost all of the official accounts of 
these matters have been shown to be the result of 
inaccurate intelligence advice and/or dissembling 
by politicians. At the very least, the Howard 
Government’s political balance, in its responses 
to the threat of terrorism, and in related security 
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issues, are open to serious doubt. So too is the 
competence of its intelligence agencies. We 
may have to wait for the thirty-year embargo to 
expire before scholars can examine the relevant 
archives thoroughly on these matters – cold 
comfort for some of us.
(ii) RAMSI self-congratulation
Official self-congratulation about the RAMSI 
intervention is part of a growing confidence that 
Australia can intervene in the region, including 
PNG, with positive results (Wainwright 2003). 
The reasoning is that if RAMSI can succeed, 
then the ECP will also succeed. But there are two 
flaws in this logic. 
First, whether optimism about RAMSI is 
justified remains to be seen. Things can still go 
wrong, as is evident in the killing of an Australian 
police officer in Honiara in December 2004. The 
Anglican Bishop of Malaita has offered a sobering 
account of the intervention thus far:
[T]here is a major disparity between 
RAMSI’s rhetoric of staying for ten 
to 15 years in the Solomons, bringing 
peace and prosperity, and the reality of 
re-emerging violence, increasing poverty 
and unemployment, high school fees, a 
down-ward spiraling economy, higher 
inﬂation and lower incomes, declining 
medical services, ongoing corruption in 
government ministries, lack of planning and 
implementation of how Solomon Islanders 
will competently run all parts of their own 
government, crumbling infrastructure, 
millions and millions of RAMSI funds 
spent on Australians with money going 
back to Australia with minimum cash 
beneﬁt for Solomon Islanders, continued 
centralizing of everything in Honiara, etc. 
(Brown 2005)
There are growing demands from some 
Solomon Islands politicians for an early date for 
a RAMSI withdrawal. These moves are based, 
in part, on naked self-interest – some of them 
might be fearful of arrest for corruption, or on 
other criminal charges. But they are also based on 
concerns that things are starting to go wrong, or 
that they are not going right – thus echoing the 
bishop’s observations. 
Second, even if these worries can (or will) 
be addressed, RAMSI remains a multilateral 
arrangement. The ECP is a bi-lateral arrangement 
– though some in PNG see it as Australian 
unilateralism. This multilateralism has given 
the RAMSI intervention a higher degree of 
legitimacy than the ECP is likely to engender, at 
least in the short term.
(iii) The failed state orthodoxy
The Australian Government appears to be 
under the influence of aid critics like Helen 
Hughes whose thesis is that PNG’s system of 
governance is all but dysfunctional. Her analysis 
assumes that the infrastructure and administrative 
culture of the modern state should be replicated, 
or be in process of advanced replication, in 
PNG, regardless of traditional structures. This 
“Eurocentric” statist model stresses law and order, 
the openness of the state to international market 
forces, and “transparency” in relation to the 
applications of international aid and investment 
regimes. One could be forgiven for thinking that 
it is about states that can make trains run on 
time, rather than states that are committed to 
what Amartya Sen has famously referred to as 
“development as freedom” (Sen 2000). It also 
uncritically assumes a form of state construction 
that would facilitate “predatory globalization” 
(Falk 1999). As such, its theoretical ramifications 
and policy consequences need painstaking 
interrogation and comprehensive revision. 
This is not to deny that there are severe 
law and order problems in PNG. Basic services 
are not reaching far from the major centres. 
Even within the major centres services are, 
at best, unpredictable (although electricity 
blackouts and failures in the water supply in 
Port Moresby are predictable in the sense they 
will occur when least anticipated). The spread 
of HIV/AIDS is catastrophic. Population growth 
is outstripping economic growth. Violence and 
crime are increasing at worrying rates (Nibbrig 
1992; Goddard 1992; Strathern 1993, Goddard 
1995; Levantis 1997; Dinnen 1998; Dinnen 
1999; Nibbrig 2002). It is well known that 
corruption is endemic throughout politics, the 
public service, the courts, and the police force 
(see, e.g., Okole and Kavanamur 2003). Indeed 
it is so well known that it is now widely taken for 
granted – Papua New Guineans are beginning – 
wearily, despairingly – to tolerate the intolerable 
in their governments.
 (iv) Treasury versus AusAID
There is a growing belief that the Howard 
government has become impatient with the ways 
in which its aid programs have been administered 
by AusAID and related agencies. Senior Canberra 
officials (in Treasury, perhaps influenced by 
Hughes’ economism, in Prime Minister’s and 
Cabinet, and in Foreign Affairs and Trade) are 
concluding that past programs have not stemmed 
the growing governance crisis in PNG. A new 
(or is it a return to the old?) realism seems to be 
replacing AusAID idealism. Hugh White puts 
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Islands and in the context of global security 
and the understanding that a porous and 
undeveloped region is not in the interests 
of the Paciﬁc or Australia. (Australian 
Government, AusAID, 2004: 4)
VII: ECP IMPLEMENTATION
Nonetheless, not a few experts believe that, 
if the ECP remains a short-term strategy, it 
will fail. Governance capacity in PNG will 
continue to decline, possibly to levels of a Haiti 
or a Zimbabwe. More will need to be done. 
This must include well-informed bottom-up 
community development programs and related 
schemes – e.g., addressing the worsening squatter 
settlements crisis, attacking high unemployment 
rates, stopping widespread violence against 
women, halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and 
other pandemics, and providing for better family 
and child care.12 In the case of PNG’s HIV/AIDS 
crisis, effective AusAID programs should be seen 
as a model for future planning. In addition, top-
down assistance is essential to drastically overhaul 
capacity-building institutions, especially in the 
technical and higher education sectors. And a 
sensitive and intelligent balance of bottom-up 
and top-down planning is critical for rebuilding 
basic infrastructure (and in some cases building it 
for the first time) – e.g., roads, housing, schools, 
and hospitals and medical aid posts (especially for 
women and for people living with HIV/AIDS). 
As the ASPI report rightly advises: 
Strengthening the national government 
capabilities and institutions that PNG 
needs is going to take our neighbour a 
long time, so our program of support 
likewise needs to have a long time frame. 
Nothing lasting can be achieved in three 
or ﬁve years, and little enough in a decade. 
We need to think instead in terms of 
generations. (Australian Strategic and 
Policy Institute 2004: 41; see also White 
2005)
VIII: RESPONSES TO THE ECP 
What have been some early responses to the 
ECP?
There is a danger the ECP will become a 
latter day cargo cult, with over-heated Papua 
New Guinean expectations about what the ECP 
can and should deliver. In rural areas especially, 
there is a growing nostalgia for the colonial 
it bluntly: “It [helping PNG] cannot be done 
through the conventional forms of development 
aid” (White 2005). A similar view was put by 
the Australian Treasurer in a speech on 3 August 
2004. In this speech Peter Costello aired his 
concern (and maybe echoed his bureaucrats’ 
concerns) that “aid can hinder as well as help” 
governments that come to “rely on donors to 
provide essential services to their peoples”:
A striking example of the limitations of 
aid has been the economic performance of 
the Paciﬁc in recent years. If we look at 
the Paciﬁc growth record from 1992-2002 
GDP per capita growth was less than one 
percent, in a period of time when all aid 
ﬂows per capita to the region averaged 
US$96 – the highest of any region in the 
world. […] 
The link between good governance 
and the effectiveness of aid gives rise to 
concern where countries have relatively 
poor governance. In such cases we need 
to review our discussions about increasing 
overall aid levels – which we know will 
be of no help in such circumstances – to 
how we can use existing aid to improve 
governance, grow capital and build 
institutions. […]
The RAMSI and ECP missions represent 
an integrated whole of government 
approach to improving governance. This 
is about much more than law and order, 
it includes ways for improving the justice 
system, economic management, public 
sector reform and border management. 
For example, there are now around 15 
senior Treasury staff in PNG, Solomon 
Islands and Nauru alongside local staff 
in key areas such as ﬁnancial control, 
debt management and economic reform. 
(Costello 2004)
It is in the context of these four broad influences 
that the ECP has begun to be implemented in 
PNG. With this involvement (amounting to 
A$805 million over the four year period to June 
2008, in addition to the annual aid program of 
A$330 million) Australian authorities hope that 
some of PNG’s main governance failings will be 
addressed. In its latest policy document, AusAID 
appears to have accommodated itself to this new 
approach: 
A fundamental policy shift by Australia 
has sharpened the focus of engagement 
through necessity following the 
deterioration of security in the Solomon 
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era – “taim bilong masta”. Old people pine 
for a return to the days when services seemed 
reliable and the authorities – and the kiaps 
– gave them more than a passing glance. Young 
people are disillusioned (in growing numbers and 
with increasing bitterness) with their politicians 
and feel defeated in the face of the enormous 
challenges facing their country. They see little 
future for themselves, or for the next generation. 
They are constantly struggling against inadequate 
facilities for training and higher education. There 
are few meaningful jobs or careers to which they 
can look forward. Their political leaders seem 
loftily unconcerned by their plight. So they 
are likely to look to something like the ECP as 
a panacea for their problems. Are Australians 
aware of this growing expectation? Do they 
realize that they are heightening expectations 
across the country?
Then there is the complacent but widespread 
belief in PNG that, if a problem can’t be solved 
by Papua New Guineans, you can usually get 
the Australians in – to fix the roads, build the 
bridges, fund HIV/AIDS programs, provide IT 
services for schools, and so on. Big brother will 
nearly always come good if the need is urgent 
enough.13 This family metaphor is dangerous. 
While some Papua New Guineans might think 
of Australia in quasi-familial terms, there is 
little doubt that Australia looks at PNG through 
spectacles that focus sharply on its own security 
and economic interests. 
Even so, there are misgivings in PNG about 
the ECP. The most outspoken exponent of this 
position is the Governor of Morobe Province, 
Luther Wenge. Wenge has opposed the ECP since 
its inception – though he voted for its enabling 
legislation in the Parliament. He has threatened 
to meet its attempted deployment in his province 
with violence. He believes that there is nothing 
wrong in PNG that Papua New Guineans can’t 
solve themselves; hence, he concludes, the ECP 
is not necessary. He argues that it undermines 
the PNG Constitution. And he is concerned that 
deployment of foreign police, judges, and public 
servants in PNG will compromise the country’s 
sovereignty. 
Not a few politicians and public officials play 
down the rapidly mutating governance crisis in 
PNG. Like the Morobe Governor, they insist 
that things are not as bad as they seem. They 
are either naïve or disingenuous. The group’s 
members are notorious for big-noting their 
governance capabilities, even when the evidence 
is against them – e.g., the 1997 Sandline affair 
(Dorney 1998). They fail to acknowledge that 
state failure is a real possibility in PNG and 
they deny playing a role in bringing this about. 
Their opposition to the ECP might also reflect 
a growing unease about what may be unearthed 
if effective policing efforts are put in place 
to address issues of corruption in high places. 
Wenge’s political grandstanding against the ECP 
may be a prelude to the last stand of the bigmen 
in PNG politics.
The loss of sovereignty argument is nonetheless 
troubling to thoughtful Papua New Guineans. As 
noted earlier, during the 2004 election campaign 
Prime Minister Howard restated his view that 
Australia has the right to make pre-emptive strikes 
against terrorist groups threatening Australian 
security and operating out of neighbouring 
states. Could this result in Australia over-riding 
PNG objections to preemptive or retaliatory 
action if terrorists (or international criminals) 
were operating out of PNG? As experiences in 
countries like Afghanistan and Iraq indicate, 
these actions inevitably cause civilian injuries 
and deaths and massive collateral damage. 
This concern is compounded when questions 
are asked about accountability for Australian 
personnel deployed under the ECP agreement. 
Initially the ECP’s implementation was delayed 
because of objections in PNG to demands for 
immunity for Australian officials from PNG 
law. Subsequently these demands were watered 
down, to apply only to certain “designated 
persons” (e.g., Australian judges and associated 
legal officials). In late October 2004 the PNG 
Ombudsman-General and a former Solicitor-
General joined Governor Wenge in his action 
in the High Court to test the constitutionality of 
this arrangement. In particular, the Ombudsman-
General is arguing that certain provisions in 
the ECP agreement undermine the powers of 
his office stipulated in the PNG Constitution 
and under the Organic Law on the Duties and 
Responsibilities of Leadership (Rheeney 2004). 
The outcome of this reference to the Court is 
still pending.14
But the issue of accountability remains a 
problem, not only for Luther Wenge and others, 
and not only on constitutional grounds. To whom 
will the Australian police and public servants 
ultimately be answerable? Who will determine 
their deployment and their responsibilities? 
Will it turn out like Australia’s involvement in 
RAMSI, where important decisions are taken 
by interdepartmental committees in Canberra, 
with little or no consultation with the Solomon 
Islands Government? If this happens for PNG the 
ECP could develop into its shadow government. 
These concerns are gaining a heightened saliency 
with several political leaders declaring that, while 
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something like the ECP is unfortunately necessary, 
it is not yet a PNG-owned development with the 
kind of legitimacy that ownership should bring. 
Some Papua New Guineans are uncomfortable 
with the complacency with which the Somare 
Government has facilitated the ECP. For much 
of 2004, the Government was preoccupied with 
a no-confidence motion in the Parliament. 
Controversially, it suspended Parliament for 
months at a time and engaged in some imaginative 
tactics to block the Opposition’s attempts to get 
the no-confidence motion debated on the floor of 
the House. The Government’s obsession with the 
politics of survival meant that the ECP was not 
exhaustively debated in the National Parliament. 
Nor did it receive the airing expected in public 
forums across the country. Nonetheless, it is well 
known that Sir Michael Somare held out against 
the ECP for some ten months. It was a coterie of 
“progressive” Ministers who finally won over the 
Cabinet and a reluctant Prime Minister.15 
In PNG politics, five minutes can be a long 
time. Coalitions (grand and otherwise) rise and 
fall with the fickleness of a comic opera, though 
the policy consequences for ordinary Papua New 
Guineans are invariably negative. Nearly all of 
the post-independence PNG parliaments have 
been defiled by mendacious squabbles between 
would-be prime ministers and their venal backers. 
Time-honoured understandings of the public 
good and wise statesmanship are unwelcome 
strangers in these counterproductive wranglings. 
The reluctance of the Somare Government to 
develop a fully rounded case for a form of 
ECP – or something more far-reaching, that 
will significantly benefit PNG – is yet another 
example of how good public policy is routinely 
sacrificed to base politicking in the National 
Parliament. 
Others fear that Australia may lack the will 
or the capacity to do the job properly. As former 
Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta, has noted:
If effective, it [the ECP] will bite. Once it 
does bite, it is sure to encounter resistance. 
Institutional weaknesses are now so 
widespread that many players – up, down 
and across the system – beneﬁt from the 
weakness, and will see no beneﬁt in change. 
They will oppose change. (Morauta 2004)
Will this kind of opposition – which will surely 
intensify – see Australia backing off? (A similar 
political challenge is happening in the Solomons, 
to RAMSI.) Others wonder if Australia will 
get distracted along the way and quit before 
anything sustainable is achieved. This anxiety 
is not without substance given the unexpected 
circumstances surrounding Australia’s precipitous 
“return” to the South Pacific. Just how whimsical 
has it all been? If the Bush administration sounds 
the charge again, will Australia go galloping 
off to a Battle for Taiwan, for example, or to 
a preemptive strike against North Korea, or 
to a war in Iran – withdrawing from its ECP 
commitments along the way? 
Finally, there is growing resentment in Port 
Moresby about effects the ECP deployment is 
already having on everyday economic life. Even 
at this early stage in the program, some landlords 
have begun “rausing” bona fide tenants from 
houses and apartments in anticipation of higher 
rents from ECP personnel.16 This is seen as a 
prelude to higher prices in other areas. Once 
again Sir Mekere Morauta’s observations are 
apposite:
[T]he distorting effects of the injection of 
300 foreign workers into the community, 
all at once, should be recognized. The cost 
of rented accommodation in Port Moresby 
has sky rocketed and a chain reaction 
of shortage of rental accommodation is 
already being experienced. The Yacht 
Club will deﬁnitively overtake the Aviat 
as the Australian Cultural Centre, and a 
few other bars and restaurants will witness 
a temporary boom. Are these positive 
long-term beneﬁts to the economy and 
people of Papua New Guinea? I doubt. 
(Morauta 2004: 21)
IX: CONCLUSION
It seems then that PNG has three choices. (i) It 
welcomes the ECP and cooperates with Australia 
on Australia’s terms. Or (ii) it may be pressured 
into accepting the intervention on Australia’s 
terms. Or (iii) it can seize the opportunities 
provided by the ECP to become very serious 
about how Australia is to be persuaded to address 
a PNG agenda as well as an Australian agenda. 
The last choice is the most complex. It requires 
sophisticated thinking from Papua New Guinea’s 
leaders and tough-minded diplomacy from its 
foreign affairs bureaucrats. As suggested earlier, 
there is not much evidence of sophistication or 
tough-mindedness, so far, in any of the debates 
in PNG about the ECP. It is time for the 
real ECP debate to begin. Never before has 
PNG’s leadership been confronted with such a 
challenge. 
That there is a need for something like an 
ECP is not seriously in question, whatever the 
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Luther Wenges of this world want us to believe. 
It is imperative that the proper development of 
an ECP-like arrangement be based on a sensitive, 
mutually respectful agreement, first between PNG 
and Australia, then with the other Pacific Island 
Forum states. This means conceiving far more 
sophisticated programs that are as much based 
on bottom-up considerations as they are on top-
down schemes developed by remote Canberra 
bureaucrats.
At the same time, the state-making model 
informing the current ECP deployment needs 
substantial revision. Nothing less than a new 
state-making paradigm is required (see, e.g., 
Carment 2004; Fukuyama 2004). If contemporary 
statist thinking is not approached more creatively 
– i.e., if modern state structures themselves are 
not radically interrogated in relation to the 
conditions and needs of PNG and its peoples 
– no form of sustainable state-making can occur 
in PNG (or, for that matter, anywhere else in the 
South Pacific). It will be just more of the same: 
bumbling on amidst ramshackle institutions led 
by politicians and bureaucrats who lack the 
intellectual capacity and political will to make 
the necessary changes. A new paradigm can 
only be achieved if there is a wide and frank 
collaboration between policy makers and their 
advisers, NGOs, and academics – and above all, 
in close consultation with the men and women 
of PNG who live out their lives in mainly 
remote and harsh conditions and whose needs 
are therefore quite specific. As intimated earlier, 
it is starkly evident that there never has been 
a sustained, functioning state in large parts of 
PNG. State-making was never a serious part of 
the colonial and decolonizing processes anyway. 
A new theoretical approach to nation-building 
is one thing; getting it all to work in practice is 
another. This will require a multilateralism that 
goes way beyond the current unilateral/bilateral 
ECP arrangements. While there are multilateral 
arrangements already in place that could be 
employed in a more comprehensive, generous 
and effective interventionism (e.g., the Pacific 
Islands Forum, APEC), there is a need to develop 
a more innovative culture of inter-regional and 
multilateral engagement that will legitimize the 
kinds of intervention now necessary to rescue 
many thousands of peoples from their weak and 
vulnerable states in the South Pacific. It is also 
time to make the Pacific Islands Forum more 
than a paper tiger – to give it real teeth, real 
claws, and a real roar. Without doubt Australia 
must play a leadership role in this development. 
However, Australia’s capacities are limited. It 
cannot do all that needs to be done on its own. 
Australia now has a golden opportunity – 
arguably one that is far more auspicious than 
FTAs with the USA, China, or selected Southeast 
Asian economies – to develop nuanced and 
effective niche diplomacy in the South Pacific, to 
lend gravitas to its hitherto airy claims to middle 
power status in global affairs. To achieve this, it 
needs to get its new interventionism in the South 
Pacific right. This means rethinking a great deal 
of the failed orthodoxy on states, state-making 
and failing states. And it means reconceiving the 
ECP as a wider and longer project, providing a 
sustained and reliable commitment to the region, 
and multilateralizing that commitment as widely 
as possible. 
Effective niche diplomacy by Australia, in 
PNG and across the South Pacific, will have 
to be far more imaginative than the ECP in its 
present form – though it may yet prove to be 
a first, tentative step in this very worthwhile 
direction. 
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ENDNOTES
1 This is not to ignore some real success stories in 
PNG. Some examples were discussed at a conference 
jointly organized by DWU and the ANU in Madang 
in December 2004. The successes it revealed 
typically involved individuals and communities 
working independently or with outsiders (e.g., 
INGOs or AusAID), to cope with challenges thrown 
up by existing state inadequacies. While their very 
existence conﬁrms problems in the post-colonial 
state in PNG, they nonetheless demonstrate that 
there are sub-state structures in place that could be 
mobilized in new forms of successful state-making. 
2 “Aspirational voters” are upwardly mobile citizens 
who invest heavily in material symbols of what 
they interpret to be their self-constructed success 
in the world (e.g., large houses, big cars, private 
schools for their children, luxury holidays, club 
memberships, personal ﬁtness, dieting and life-style 
activities, soft porn private entertainment systems, 
etc.). More and Salecl note: “[N]ow self construction 
has become a cultural imperative in the West, and 
the emphasis is not on social determination, but on 
the individual project of self-making” (2004:19). 
The material symbols are needed by these voters as 
public expressions – hard evidence – of their “worth” 
in the self-making process. However, aspirationals’ 
investments (or borrowings) make them vulnerable 
to interest-rate hikes, job insecurity, and other life 
crises. This produces a petty-bourgeois politics of 
highly anxious possessive individualism – or “neo-
conservatism”.
3 Australians have only themselves to blame for 
bovinely standing by while governments run down 
Asian and Paciﬁc studies curricula in schools and 
universities. The simple fact is that such curricula 
are vital to the future of the Australia’s economy and 
security. 
4 Too many modern scholars exhibit reductive 
– even prejudiced – views of religious sentiments 
in contemporary societies around the world. The 
consequent theoretical and empirical weaknesses 
in their analyses are especially evident in the face 
of powerful forces linking religious sentiments to 
the politics of global dispossession. This is as true 
of those scholars’ inadequate understandings of 
fundamentalisms in the West as it is of non-Western 
fundamentalisms – see, e.g., Samuel Huntington’s 
opinionated yet inﬂuential “clash of civilizations” 
thesis (Huntington 1996). There is an urgent need 
for a renewal of comparative religion studies in the 
fraying fabric of late-modern social theory.
5 For example: Eight out of ten Americans exit-polled 
after the 2004 Presidential election in November 
2004 said they voted for President George W. 
Bush because of “moral [read: rightwing Christian] 
values”. Some 42% of Americans share Bush’s 
status as a “born again Christian”. Many are avidly 
supportive of repealing abortion laws. Many of these 
people voted in 11 states to outlaw gay marriages. 
“The organized religious right, such as the Christian 
Coalition, takes credit for putting Bush back in the 
White House” (Gardels 2004). For a pioneering 
study of contemporary religious neo-conservatism in 
Australia see Maddox (2005). As in the USA and 
Australia, so in PNG (and throughout the South 
Paciﬁc) there are marked political mobilizations of 
Christian fundamentalism. Some of these groups 
in PNG are preparing political organizations and 
identifying potential candidates to contest the 2007 
general election.
6 A small but telling illustration is recorded by Ian 
Downs: “The Currie report [1963] […] recommended 
the immediate establishment of an autonomous 
university in Papua and New Guinea and emphasized 
the commission’s feeling of urgency by proposing a 
preliminary year in 1964. However […] it took the 
Barnes administration twelve months to publicly 
accept the need for a national university and another 
year to appoint an interim council. Those who 
advocated an autonomous university are agreed that, 
without the Foot report of 1962, higher education 
would have been limited, at best, to a college of the 
ANU in Canberra, perhaps Port Moresby”. (Downs 
1980:246)
7 These included Michael Somare, Albert Maori 
Kiki, Tony Voutas, Moi Avei, John Momis, Rabbie 
Namaliu, and John Kaputin Some of the idealism of 
this period is captured in two autobiographies, Ten 
Thousand Years in a Lifetime (Kiki 1968) and Sana: 
An Autobiography (Somare 1975). These, however, 
were products of the heroic past. There will be less 
to celebrate in future autobiographies, especially if 
they are truthful. 
8 Though as the ASPI report notes, it was also 
parsimonious, approximating the annual budget of 
one of Canberra’s public hospitals (approximately 
$350 million per annum, about one third of the 
PNG Government’s annual budget).
9 Greg Urwin, a former diplomat with long standing 
experience and ties in the South Paciﬁc.
10 The EPG was chaired by Sir Julius Chan, a former 
PNG Prime Minister.
11 A senior MP in PNG has expressed dismay at what 
he sees as a shift from the original ECP proposal, with 
“too many young Australian constables on the beat in 
Port Moresby”. These are not the senior, experienced, 
mentoring ofﬁcers the PNG Government was 
expecting. He believes there is too much duplicating 
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of what PNG police are already doing and too little 
of the planned capacity-building. 
12 For example, the National AIDS Council statistical 
ofﬁcer, Agnes George, recently reported an increase 
in the HIV/AIDS infection rate among two to nine 
year old children, through “molesting of the victims 
and rape” (Lasibori 2005).
13 This is not an implied criticism of AusAID which, 
to its credit, has stepped in and addressed many 
potential (and actual) crises in the past. AusAID’s 
contributions to PNG over three decades of 
independence should not be underestimated, 
but should now be systematically and objectively 
analyzed. This is area of research that would especially 
beneﬁt from contributions from PNG scholars.
14 There is a general view – conﬁrmed by a Minister 
and a senior MP – that if the Court upholds the 
Wenge complaint, the Parliament will facilitate 
a constitutional change to maintain the ECP 
arrangements. Apparently this strategy has cross-
party backing.
15 The Ministers were led by Foreign Minister Sir 
Rabbie Namaliu and included Petroleum and Energy 
Minister Sir Moi Avei, Treasurer Bart Philemon, 
former Communications Minister (now Minister 
for Lands) Dr Puka Tema, and Inter-Governmental 
Relations Minister Sir Peter Barter.
16 One case involves an entire block of apartments, 
set high on concrete stilts, overlooking a beach in 
Port Moresby. The owners have been systematically 
moving out local and non-ECP tenants – a move to 
be completed by March 2005 – to make way for more 
ECP tenants. The intention is to make it an entirely 
ECP enclave. Some ECP personnel have already 
moved in and have fast become unpopular among 
their resentful neighbours for their loud parties and 
boisterous behavior around the complex’s swimming 
pool / barbeque area. Rumours abound – but rumours 
can have negative consequences. The era of the 
Ugly Australian may be at hand in PNG – or it may 
be about to be indelibly reinforced. 
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